EXAMINING INDIA’S MOTIVES FOR CAUSING THE STRATEGIC INSTABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA

Abstract

Nuclear deterrence aimed to prevent adversaries from planning and organising acts of violence and war, driven by the fear of consequences they could ill afford. Intellectuals during the Cold War also made us believe that the nuclear states would not go to war with each other due to the presence of undefendable atomic weapons. Perhaps the dicta held its ground during the Cold War era due to the establishment of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) between the two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union. However, if the same were to happen in South Asia as well, it would perhaps be too optimistic. India has time and again challenged the establishment of strategic stability and insists that there is a space for war under the nuclear overhang. In doing so, India has made two attempts, in February 2019 and May 2025, to engage Pakistan in violent conflicts, mainly using its air power against Pakistan’s counterforce and countervalue targets deep inside Pakistan. Pakistan responded in kind with the requisite means, ably led by the Pakistan Air Force.  Deploying deductive reasoning and an explanatory approach, this paper aims to examine India’s motives to challenge the dictum that nuclear states do not go to war with each other directly.