RECALIBRATING DETERRENCE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF NUCLEAR DOCTRINES AND STRATEGIC STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA’S EMERGING STRATEGIC TRIANGLE (2015–2025)

Abstract

This study offers a thorough comparison of the changing nuclear doctrines and deterrence tactics of **China, India, and Pakistan** from 2015 to 2025, a decade characterized by **doctrinal recalibration**, increasing **technological sophistication**, and an increase in the frequency of

**conventional and sub-conventional conflicts**. These three nuclear-armed nations constitute a

**strategic triangle** whose internal imbalances and unsolved conflicts jeopardize regional and international security as they operate in an increasingly disputed geopolitical environment.  The doctrinal changes are critically examined, including **China's nuclear expansion coupled with ambiguity in no-first-use enforcement**, **India's shift in posture from credible minimum deterrence toward more assertive signaling**, and **Pakistan's full spectrum deterrence incorporating tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs)**. These changes are part of a larger context of strategic instability that has been made worse by breakthroughs in cyber capabilities, MIRVs, hypersonic   weapons, and   ISR   (Intelligence,   Surveillance,   Reconnaissance).

The delicate line between conventional retribution and possible nuclear signaling is highlighted by recent events, including the Galwan Valley standoff (2020), the Pulwama-Balakot escalation (2019), and most significantly, the 2024 Pahalgam attack and its cross-border ramifications. The Pahalgam event, which rekindled acrimonious discourse and military vigilance between India and Pakistan, serves as an example of the increasing unpredictable nature of conflict escalation in a setting lacking effective crisis management procedures. This paper presents the case that South Asia is heading toward a deterrence environment characterized by greater volatility and reduced predictability by utilizing a mixed-method approach that combines doctrinal analysis, strategic stability theory, and empirical case studies. In order to avoid unintentional escalation, it ends with policy recommendations centered on reviving arms control discussions, institutionalizing crisis communication, and creating a trilateral framework for fostering confidence.