CYBER-ENABLED ISR AND THE DIGITAL SECURITY DILEMMA AT INDIAN OCEAN MARITIME CHOKE POINTS

Abstract

In the maritime dimension, the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is a region of strategic importance and it has been contested through naval presence, basing rights and control of sea lines of communication (SLCs) in the past. This article proposes that a parallel and increasingly significant competition has arisen in the digital and orbital spheres: cyber-enabled intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), that is the collection of satellite imagery, Automatic Identification System (AIS) monitoring, undersea sensor networks and submarine cable infrastructure, is now not only a means of maritime domain awareness but also a source of strategic unease for littoral and extra-regional powers. Based on Jervis's security dilemma concept and its application to the cyber domain, the article extends the security dilemma concept to a “digital security dilemma” associated with maritime choke points, where the multi-purpose, hidden, and harder-to-attract nature of cyber-ISR technologies means that the distinction between situational awareness and intelligence preparation for offense is not always clear. In the spirit of case studies, the author discusses AIS spoofing, satellite surveillance, and the weaknesses of undersea cables at the Strait of Hormuz, Bab-el-Mandeb, and the Strait of Malacca, respectively, to illustrate how these add to mutual mistrust between rival parties, such as India, China, Iran, the Houthis, and extra-regional navies. The article ends with policy proposals for confidence-building and regional cyber-maritime governance approaches to help dampen escalatory dynamics while not undermining legitimate security interests.