THE RESTRUCTURED STATE: BIFURCATED JURISPRUDENCE, EXECUTIVE AGGRANDIZEMENT, AND HYBRID CONSTITUTIONALISM UNDER PAKISTAN’S 26TH AND 27TH AMENDMENTS

Abstract

This article examines the legal, structural, and institutional consequences of Pakistan’s 26th and 27th Constitutional Amendments for separation of powers, judicial independence, and civil-military balance. It argues that the amendments collectively effect a profound reconfiguration of constitutional authority by bifurcating jurisdiction through Constitutional Benches and the Federal Constitutional Court, restructuring the Judicial Commission of Pakistan to enhance executive-parliamentary influence, departing from the seniority principle in judicial elevation, and constitutionally entrenching military command through the office of Chief of Defence Forces. Using a doctrinal and institutional framework grounded in Pakistani constitutional jurisprudence, particularly Al-Jehad Trust and District Bar Association, the article evaluates whether these reforms are compatible with the Constitution’s salient features and the basic structure doctrine. It further situates the amendments within international standards on judicial independence and comparative constitutional experience. The article concludes that, although framed as measures of efficiency and reform, the amendments significantly expand executive and military leverage over core constitutional institutions, raising serious concerns about judicial autonomy, constitutional supremacy, and democratic accountability in Pakistan.