THE INDEPENDENCE OF JUDICIARY IN PAKISTAN: AN ANALYTICAL STUDY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 26 AMENDMENT

Abstract

This research examines the implications of Pakistan’s 26th Constitutional Amendment (2024) on the independence, structure, and functioning of the judiciary. The amendment introduced sweeping reforms, including the establishment of a Special Parliamentary Committee for appointing the Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP), expanded political representation within the Judicial Commission of Pakistan, and narrowed the scope of suo motu powers. Using a qualitative research design and relying on secondary data, including constitutional documents, parliamentary records, legal commentaries, and landmark judicial cases, the study evaluates how these changes alter the balance between the judiciary and the political branches of the state. A comparative lens with India’s, United Kingdom and United States with their judicial appointment model further contextualizes the evolving shifts in Pakistan’s legal landscape. The findings reveal that the 26th Amendment significantly compromises judicial autonomy, increases political influence over judicial appointments, and restricts operational independence. The paper concludes that while the amendment aims to enhance transparency and institutional accountability, its structural redesign risks weakening constitutional safeguards essential for maintaining an impartial and independent judiciary.