THE CONCEPT OF FREE WILL IN DETERMINISTIC FRAMEWORKS: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY
Keywords:
Free Will, Determinism, Moral Responsibility, Compatibilism, Agency TheoryAbstract
Exploring the concept of free will within deterministic frameworks remains one of the most challenging and enduring questions in philosophy. The debate spans metaphysics, ethics, cognitive science, and neuroscience, raising concerns about whether autonomous agency can coexist with a causally ordered universe. Understanding these tensions requires both conceptual clarity and systematic analysis of how major theories such as compatibilism, libertarianism, hard determinism, and revisionism frame the relationship between causation, choice, and moral responsibility. To address this complexity, the present inquiry employs a dual methodological approach that combines philosophical interpretation with a structured dataset of 400 coded concepts, arguments, and disciplinary categories. Statistical techniques, including entropy measures, frequency analysis, and chi-square testing, reveal patterns in how free-will discourse is constructed, organized, and contested across subfields. The findings indicate that contemporary scholarship is increasingly interdisciplinary, integrating empirical insights from neuroscience and psychology with traditional philosophical reasoning. Moreover, the conceptual landscape suggests a shift toward hybrid views of agency that acknowledge causal constraint without abandoning meaningful self-governance or ethical accountability. By synthesizing historical perspectives, theoretical debates, and quantitative patterns, the research offers a clearer and more comprehensive mapping of how free will is theorized within deterministic contexts
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