

THE GARRISON STATE PARADOX: MILITARY CULTURE, STATE EFFICIENCY, AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE; A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PRUSSIA AND PAKISTAN

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Abstract

This paper will analyse how military culture, state efficiency, and democratic governance relate by providing a comparative study of the Prussia (1800-1945) and Pakistan (1947-2025). The study addresses the role of militarized state institutions in governance and maintains that although a military institution can boost administrative capacity in the short run, the prolonged military supremacy weakens democracy and long-term state performance. The analysis focuses on some major questions: How did Australian military culture assist in bringing efficiency to the state and what were the effects on the development of democracy? What is the role of the military set up in governance and civilian rule in Pakistan? What are the parallels between the Prussian militarism and the civil-military relationships that the country of Pakistan has? And what can be learned by comparing the two? How do these conditions make military institutions compatible with democratic governance and sustainable development? A comparative historical approach compares two experiences of Prussia and Pakistan, which were evaluated in terms of the interrelation between military strength and government. Based on the theories of civil-military relations, hybrid regimes and state capacity, the study reveals how it is through militarization that state apparatuses are empowered yet this leads to stunted democratic consolidation. These findings can improve the literature on state governance and democratic resilience because it explains the danger of military overreach when a weak democracy is involved. Finally, the analysis highlights the theoretical importance of discovering the military impact on governance and proposes policy suggestions to address the situation by returning civilian domination and enhancing democratic institutions with significant effects on other nations undergoing similar difficulties. And the article will wrap up with policy recommendations on restoring civilian supremacy and cementing the democratic institutions by decolonizing them of military expansion in the affected states.

INTRODUCTION

The Enduring Question of the Sword and the State

The connection of military power and the state have been long a mystery to political theorists. How can a state accumulate weapons of defence sufficient to provide security without raising these weapons to control the institutions of the civilians? This dilemma is even not very pleasant when considering those states where the military culture is not just regulating the defence policy, but also the governmental system. Prussia historically admired in terms of efficiency in the use of bureaucracy and military prowess and Pakistan where military institutions tend to have shadow governments can serve as good comparison material to appreciate this paradox better. This study deals with one of the major hypotheses in the political science field: That a well-developed military culture and institutions, as observed in historical Prussia led to a more secure and improved democratic governance. As much as the common perception holds that a powerful military capacity can aid in governing a nation more than any other forms of leaders, recent findings of numerous nations have indicated that this might not be the case. Indeed, military strength may in some instances deteriorate and not improve government performance.

Research Questions

To study the history of military influence, the framework of the present research is the four questions, which are interconnected to trace the history of change in a consolidated state into a modern democratic setting.

RQ1. To what extent did the magnitude of the increase of state administrative capacity due to Prussian military culture and the related impacts on the democratic progress during the period between the unification of Germany in 1871 and the fall of the Third Reich in 1945?

RQ2. How has the military establishment in Pakistan influenced the democratic institutions since the independence of the country in 1947, and the mechanisms that keep the military dominance in the country despite the formal existence of the civilian rule?

RQ3. What parallels exist between Prussian militarism and the current civil-military relations

within Pakistan by learning lessons out of this comparative study?

RQ4. In what circumstances, including institutional arrangements, factor of culture, and socio-economic factors, can a powerful military formation support the operation of an effective democracy and promote a sustainable development?

Theoretical Framework and Methodology

The theoretical framework and methodology are based on the notion that decision-making relies on project management methods along with various other approaches. The analysis is based on a comparative historical method, in which the authors use Prussia and Pakistan as the examples that exist in different time and cultural contexts but share impressive structural similarities. The theoretical framework combines three theoretical strands, namely,

(1) Classical theory of civil-military relations (Huntington, 1957) (Janowitz, 1960)

(2) Contemporary work on hybrid regimes and democratic backsliding (Levitsky, S., & Way, L. A., 2010) (Waldner, D., & Lust, E., 2018), and

(3) Institutional analysis of state capacity and governance (Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A., 2012) (Fukuyama, 2014).

The present study is solely based on secondary information sources, which include scholarly monographs, peer-reviewed articles, governmental publications, reports published by international organizations, and credible mass-media sources. This methodological option eases the compilation of existing literature on the topic as well as in reducing the ethical and logistical barriers of using primary data collection in politically sensitive areas. The study makes use of process tracing as a methodological approach in its approach to assess the causal linkage that leads to military dominance and subsequent implications on the results of governance. In this way, the paper outlines and describes the key processes and phenomena that facilitated the spread of military influence and influenced further governmental activity.

2.1 Classical Theories of the Civil-Military Relations

The Soldier and the State (1957) by Samuel Huntington made the traditional model of understanding civil-military relations in the liberal polity codified. Huntington argued that the objective civilian control would manifest itself in case the delineation of the military and political realms is drawn through the professionalization of the military (Huntington, 1957). Arch ornaments are taught in military academies and imbibed in a political essence that make the soldiers serve the state, rather than reject it, and grant military independence in professional arenas strategy and doctrine in exchange of subjugating to civilian political powers (Huntington, 1957). Alternative paradigm was suggested by Morris Janowitz in "The Professional Soldier (1960)". He contended that modern warfare is too complicated to maintain such a rigid distinction by Huntington, arguing instead that there is a theory of convergence according to which the military and the civilian world are doomed to collide in modern industrial societies. Janowitz promoted subjective civilian control, whereby values between military and civilian leadership are used instead of institutionalization as guaranty of democratic leadership. He advised that an autonomous and strictly professional army runs the risk of breeding a mentality of a garrison state and ultimately jeopardizing democratic standards (Janowitz, 1960).

2.2 New Frameworks: Hybrid Regimes and Democratic Backsliding

The new scholarship has not focused on democracy and autocracy dualism but has questioned the concept of hybrid regimes which combine democracy and authoritarian regimes. In their attempt to characterize the system that allows the participation of electoral competition but one-sidedly manipulates the game, which is the control of the media, selective prosecutions, and manipulation of electoral rules, Levitsky and Way introduced the concept of competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky, S., & Way, L. A., 2010). All these regimes are in a grey-zone in between full democracy and being dictatorial. Waldner and Lust put further on this discussion a balance of power model, stating that institutional configurations, specifically the relative power of the

military, political, and the civil society actors, are the determinants of the game of democratization, stagnation, or backsliding of a state (Waldner, D., & Lust, E., 2018). In cases where the military establishments have enough hold power to block the decisions taken by civilians and the civilian institutions have no abilities to restrict the military prerogatives, the hybrid equilibria will appear such that they cannot be deepened with democracy (Khan, 2010).

2.3 The Deep State Concept

The idea of the deep state has gained analytical traction within the framework of how to elaborate on how unelected institutions exercise power alongside a formal government. Unlike classical forms of military coups, where takeovers occur overtly, deep state coups take place through covert manipulation by influencing court rulings, rigging elections, manipulating media strategies, and manipulating the economy policy through informal channels of power (Sirrs, 2017). Deep state maintains a plausible deniability and core interests of the institutions are kept safe, regardless of who is in the official office.

3.0 Prussia: The Archetype of the Militarized State (1800-1945)

3.1 Historical Foundations: Building the Military State

Prussia's transformation into a standard military state, stemmed from its humiliating defeats at the hands of Napoléon Bonaparte's Grande Army at the twin battles of Jena and Auerstedt. This catastrophic defeat, lead to comprehensive reforms led by some of the greatest military theorists and strategists of the period such as Gerhard von Scharnhorst and August von Gneisenau. These reforms fundamentally reshaped Prussia's state structure and restructured its military, creating institutions that would shape German history for a century to come (Clark, 2006). One of the most changes that resulted from these reforms, was the introduction of universal conscription, constituting the principle that all citizens owed military service to the state. This largely expanded military manpower, and made military service synonymous with masculine identity and civic duty. At the same time, Prussia established the

Kriegsakademie (War Academy) to professionalize officer education. The newly established institution of General staff which was responsible for strategic planning, became the envy of other European powers (Showalter, 1975).

More significantly, the reforms integrated and intertwined military and civilian administration. The values that represented the Prussian military culture, discipline (Disziplin), order (Ordnung), duty (Pflicht), and obedience (Gehorsam), became the centrepiece of state bureaucracy. Retired military officers were routinely appointed to senior civil service positions, which made sure that military organization and its principles seeped into civilian governance (Craig, 1964). Even though this resulted in a remarkably efficient administration, it also meant that political decision making was dominated by military logic.

3.2 Prussia: The prototype of the militarised state (1800-1945):

When Prussia was finally converted into a conventional military state the driving force was the humiliating losses, which the Grande Armée of Napoleon Bonaparte had inflicted upon it in the twin battles of Jena and Auerstedt (1806). These devastating defeats led to a wholesale reformation that was influenced by some of the most eminent military thinkers and strategists of the period, such as Gerhard von Scharnhorst and August von Gneisenau. The reforms radically changed the Prussian organisation and the reorganisation of the military, which brought institutions that would influence the German history throughout the twentieth century (Clark, 2006). Among the reforms that had the most significant impact, one can mention the establishment of universal conscription, which turned out to be the main way of making every citizen contribute military service to the state. This added significantly to the number of manpower that the army had and this was militarism as an identity of men and a sense of civic responsibility. Parallel to this event, Prussia established the Kriegsakademie (War Academy) to professionalize training as an officer. This gave rise to the so-called General Staff with its strategic planning capabilities that made the institution a vision of other European powers (Showalter, 1975). A more important

consequence was the unification of military and civil government. The pitfalls of Prussian military culture, discipline (Disziplin), order (Ordnung), duty (Pflicht) and obedience (Gehorsam), were transferred to the principles of state bureaucracy. The former army officers were strategically deployed to hold senior posts in the civil service so that the military structure and its values would be transferred to the civilian sector (Craig, 1964). Though this resulted in an effective government, it too revealed that pure military reason predominated when it came to making political choices.

3.3 Unification of Germany(1864-1871)

Prussia was moving towards German unification by military victory. The notorious quote of Otto von Bismarck which came into power as Minister-President in 1862 states that speeches and majority decisions would not solve the great questions of the time, but iron and blood would (Pflanze, 1990). The three wars that were influenced by this philosophy led to the unification of Germany and a permanent change of the political trend in the European continent. Prussia and Austria conducted the Danish War of 1864 in which they fought to regain Schleswig-Holstein that Denmark had annexed in the year 1809. In 1866 Prussia had declared war on Austria (the Austro Prussian war of 1866) and in seven weeks it had overpowered the Austrians and terminated their dominion in German matters. The defeat of the Prussians was due to the crushing of the victory and resulted in the formation of the North German Confederation under the Prussians control (Wawro, 1996). The Franco Prussian war (1870-1871) was the last push towards the convincing of the southern German states to form one and the German empire was born in 1871 (Howard, 1961). The long-term political impacts of these massive military triumphs were drastic. They showed that the practices of authoritarian by Bismarck had a functional ground, thus, marginalizing the liberal-democratic voices which formerly supported German unification by way of negotiation and popular sovereignty. The military was at its best times and it established itself as the main element of the empire. One of the historians said the army was certainly one of the most significant Prussian life institutions after 1871 (Elshakankiri, 2021).

3.4 The Constitutional Settlement: A State Nothing Better.

The Constitution of the German Empire played another role in making war independence further embedded in the constitution as it did not subject the military to civilian control. The armed forces vowed allegiance to the Kaiser, and the parliament could not oversee the military budgets. The Reichstag was at liberty to discuss social issues but not influential in significant elements of the empire including military affairs, foreign policy and the constitution itself, which was still in the control of the Prussians (Mommsen, 1995). In this manner, a situation was in fact established within a state (state in state). The military was an independent organization that had its own legal system of military courts where soldiers could be tried, has its own budgetary procedures, their own officer chain of command that reported straight to the Kaiser by-passing the parliament and a war ministry (Kitchen, 1968). Thus, the military would be able to serve its own interests as an establishment without consideration to the aspect of democratic accountability. This led to parliamentary democracy never getting a voice of authority in Germany because the military was not under its control. It is possible that the political parties contributed to the domestic legislation, though, they also appeared to be spectators of important imperial decisions. This restriction greatly affected negatively the development of the constitution whose consequences were felt in the twentieth century.

3.5 World War I and the Militarization of Politics:

World war 1 crucially exposed the German Military's tendencies and as the war dragged on, the military took on greater control over civilian life. What followed the advent of war in 1916, was labelled by historians as a "Silent Dictatorship", wherein Hindenburg Program subordinated the German economy to military production under the command of Generals Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff.

After Germany's defeat in 1918, the militarism was discredited, but only temporarily. The treaty of Versailles had limited Germany to having an army of just 100000 men. It was designed specifically to prevent Germany from ever threatening the security of Europe again. However, the Reichswehr

maintained much of Prussia's military culture and institutional autonomy in the post war Weimar Republic. Hans von Seeckt, Chief of Army Command from 1920-1926, described the Reichswehr as "a state within the state," deliberately preserving military independence from democratic oversight (Carsten, 1966).

3.6 The Road to Catastrophe: Militarism and the Third Reich:

The Weimar Republic failed in subordinating the military to democratic control, which resulted in the fall of democracy. In 1933, when Hitler assumed power, he inherited a military which had never made the attempt to reconcile itself to military rule. The German military leaders were by no means victims of Nazi tyranny, in fact they actively collaborated with Hitler's regime dreaming of the rearmament and territorial expansion promised by Hitler (Müller, 1984).

In 1935 Hitler decided to break the treaty of Versailles and begin rearmament, rebranding German military as Wehrmacht which retained Prussian military traditions and served the totalitarian Nazi regime. Germany was led into WW2 by senior officers that hailed from Prussian junker families and their complicity in the Holocaust shattered any myths that the Prussian military's professionalism ensured ethical conduct (Förster, 1988).

In the aftermath of Germany's defeat in 1945, the allies abolished Prussia as a state, citing: "Prussia is a bearer of militarism and reaction in Germany" (Allied Control Council Law No. 46, 1947). This fall was symbolic; the victors of WW2 decided that only the complete antihalation of Prussia as a state could prevent future threats to peace.

3.7 Assessment: Efficiency Without Democracy:

Prussia rise from its ruins to the heights of administrative efficiency, rapid industrialization and the establishment of sophisticated institutions for economic management and social welfare were real achievements and by some technocratic measures, even impressive (Kitchen, 1968).

This efficiency however had been achieved at a massive cost. Prussia's strong military culture and its influence over politics had obstructed democratic

growth, resulting in enthusiastic support for Nazi aggression and genocide. Hierarchical organization, emphasis on obedience, subordination of individual rights to state purposes; values, which had enabled Prussia to become so administratively effective ultimately left it too vulnerable to totalitarian mobilization.

Despite being limited in extent by modern standards, data from this period does support this assessment. Historically, Prussia always ranked high on indicators of state capacity (tax collection, infrastructure development, literacy rates), while consistently scoring extremely low on measures of democratic accountability and civil liberties (Ziblatt, 2017). This pattern of efficient Administration paired with poor democratic values provides solid grounds for evaluating modern cases like Pakistan.

4. Pakistan: Shadow Governance and the Hybrid Regime (1947-2025):

4.1 Historical Context: The Genesis of Military Dominance:

The civil-military imbalance observed in Pakistan today is nothing new and has existed since before the country's independence. The British Indian army had a culture, which emphasized hierarchy and viewed civilians with mistrust and suspicion. This institutional culture transferred as it is to the newly formed Pakistan's military. On top of that, the circumstances surrounding the foundation of Pakistan such as partition violence, the Kashmir conflict and weak civilian institutions centred the military as the country's most capable and reliable institution (Cohen, 1984).

Since then, Pakistan has gone through three formal military coups in 1958, 1977 and 1999. This means that Pakistan has been under direct military rule for 33 out of the 78 years it has been independent (Rizvi, 2000). However, if we analyse the remaining 44 years where military did not rule directly, we observe that the military still retained unchallenged authority in certain domains such as defence policy, intelligence operations, and relations with India and Afghanistan (Siddiq, 2007).

4.2 The Architecture of Military Dominance:

As mentioned before, there is an allegation that the military establishment in Pakistan run a "Deep

State". There are some mechanisms that constitute this supposed structure:

Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI): ISI is Pakistan's premier intelligence agency and operates under civilian oversight. However, effectively it reports directly to the military leadership. ISI's role in the domestic politics of Pakistan is widely documented and involves surveillance of politicians, harassment of journalists, manipulation of electoral processes, and creation of political parties to serve military interests (Haqqani, 2005). Recently, a new allegation surfaced from 6 judges of Islamabad high court, who accused the agency of intimidation and claimed that family members has been abducted to influence judicial decisions (Haseeb Bhatti , Umer Mehtab , Abdullah Zehri , Rana Bilal ,Ishaq Tanoli ,Abdul Hakeem, March 26,2024).

4.2.2 Economic Empire: Pakistan's military operates what can be considered an extensive commercial empire. Their portfolio includes real estate, banking, insurance, manufacturing, and agriculture. This is usually termed as a "Milbus". The Fauji Foundation, which is on the face value a welfare organization for retired military personnel, is the largest business conglomerate in Pakistan, controlling assets worth around \$5.9 Billion (Pakistan's richest business group is not a company but the army's Fauji Foundation, 2025, August 31) (Siddiq, 2007). The economic freedom earned through this enables the military to avoid civilian oversight and provides interest in gaining or maintaining some political influence.

4.2.3 Judicial Manipulation: Constitutional amendments, both recent and historical have enabled the military to have influence over the judiciary bodies of Pakistan. This grants military courts jurisdiction over civilians especially pertaining to matters of national security. In December 2024, former chief of ISI Lieutenant-General Faiz Hameed was indicted for "engaging in political activities" and violating the Official Secrets Act. This is an extremely rare admission of political interference by the military but has been viewed by critics as not accountability, but rather an internal score being settled by the military (Hussain, 2024, December 10).

4.2.4 Media Control: Pakistan military has been long known for shaping media narratives. This is achieved through a combination of direct ownership, advertising pressure, and intimidation. Journalists that have spoken out against the military have been subjected to harassment, abduction, or in some cases even worse. This results in a self-censorship, whereas media outlets refrain voluntarily from discussing civil-military relations (House, 2024).

4.3 Quantifying Military Dominance: Economic Data:

Secondary data reveals the extent of military economic control and its consequences for development:

Defence Spending: Following the recent military clashes with India, in the Fiscal year 2025-26 Pakistan allocated PKR 2.55 trillion (\$9 Billion) for defence which represents a 20% increase from the last year. We can compare this with other sectors using percentage of GDP as a measure. Defence spending represented 2.1% of GDP, far exceeding 1.9% for education and less than 1% for health (Economic Survey of Pakistan, 2024) (Kousar, S., Rehman, A., Zafar, M., Ali, K., & Nasir, N., 2023).

4.3.2 Social Sector Neglect: Pakistan has one of the lowest literacy rates compared to its peers and a child infant mortality rate that is among the worlds highest (UNESCO, 2023). This is due to constant underspending on public service sectors. Health expenditure just averages \$14 per capita which is less than half the lower-middle-income country average of 27 (Database, 2017).

4.3.3 Governance Quality: Pakistan consistently ranks poorly on World Bank Worldwide Governance indicator for Government effectiveness. On the scale, 2.5 (weak) to +2.5 (strong), Pakistan is placed at -0.58 in the 2023 estimates. This far below the global average of -0.04 and represents the 30th percentile in the world (Bank, 2023). IN simpler words, this suggests that Pakistan's government performs worse than 70% of the countries measured.

4.4 The Hybrid Regime Model:

Present day Pakistan is a perfect example of what is termed as a "hybrid regime" by political scientists (Levitsky, S., & Way, L. A., 2010). Pakistan does conduct all the democratic procedures; for example,

elections occur regularly, multiple parties compete, and power occasionally changes hands. This however is not representative of the actual democratic situation of the country. The military still retains the ultimate veto authority over most affairs that affect its interests. This gives an illusion of a democratic system but has all the hallmarks of authoritarian substance.

More recent research and studies have positioned Pakistan as a "tutelary hybrid regime", where military "guardianship" has become inseparable from civilian politics (Adeney, 2017) (Mohsin Ali, 2025). Gone are the days when the military staged coups to exercise power, now they deploy sophisticated mechanisms of control such as pre-election engineering (preventing disfavoured parties from competing, manipulating candidates), selective prosecution of opposition leaders, media manipulation, and strategic use of terrorism threats to justify expansion of military authority.

4.5 The 2024 Electoral Crisis: Shadow Governance Exposed:

The General elections held in February 2024 laid bare the mechanisms and contradictions of the hybrid governance. It is alleged that the military wanted to prevent the former prime minister Imran Khan's return to power. The methods we talk of are listed below, they show shadow governance in action (Institution, 2024, April 2):

4.5.1 Pre-election Manipulation: Imran was left ineligible to run for office after several criminal charges were brought against him, which many believe were politically motivated. The election commission of Pakistan also banned PTI from using its electoral symbol, A cricket bat. This meant that their candidates contested independently, and the public had great difficulty in identifying which candidates were endorsed by Pakistan Tehreek e Insaaf (Group, January 30, 2024).

4.5.2 Media Blackout: The 2024 General election was hailed by many as the most silent election in Pakistan's history. There was a widespread media blackout due to censorship surrounding Khan and PTI. The internet was also cut off in numerous locations on election day, where the support for PTI was supposedly stronger (House, 2024).

4.5.3 Vote Manipulation: As the election day concluded, PTI backed independent candidates had managed to win the greatest number of seats. There was however an outcry claiming vote manipulation because the results had been delayed for days. A government was formed nonetheless, consisting of parties that had performed relatively poorly in comparison. It was declared by many that these parties had the backing of the military, and they questioned electoral legitimacy (Mufti, 2024). The rotting relationship between the public and the military had begun to show, with the first instance of direct attack by civilians on the military coming in the form of PTI supporters that launched an attack on military installations countrywide, on May 9th, 2023.

4.6 Contemporary Challenges: The Imran Khan Factor:

Khan had initially come to power in 2018 through the establishment's backing and was seen as a military backed candidate. Once in power however, Khan clashed head on with the military over matters of appointments and policy direction. He was eventually removed from power in 2022 through a parliamentary vote of no confidence. Some allege that this was orchestrated by the military and that the opposition had worked hard to turn Khan into an opponent of the establishment (Mufti, Pakistan's hybrid regime and the May 2023 crisis, 2023).

In the aftermath, Khan was imprisoned and PTI was put through some persecution, revealing the cost of challenging the military. But some view his party's good electoral performance in face of these obstacles as a proof that there are limits to military political engineering. This created a legitimacy crisis of sorts. The military had been successful in preventing Khan from coming back to power but could not eliminate public support for Khan and neither could they manufacture additional support for military alternatives.

4.7 Economic Consequences of Milbus:

Economists and development researchers have documented the multiple ways in which the military's extensive hold over the economy distorts Pakistan's economic development:

4.7.1 Resource Misallocation: The huge spending on Defense, crowds out productive investments in other sectors such as human capital and infrastructure. This leaves very little funds to be invested in growth generating investments and consequently, 47% of Pakistan's Federal expenditure goes to debt servicing.

4.7.2 Rent-Seeking and Corruption: The advantages that military commercial enterprises earn such as regulatory advantages, tax exemptions, and preferential access to land and contracts, create unfair competition in the market and discourages private sector growth as well as foreign investment (Siddiqi, 2007). It has been reported recently that the military enterprises control land holdings worth billions of dollars, that were supposedly acquired far below the market rates (Dawn, 31st August 2025).

4.7.3 Regional Inequality: Baluchistan, despite being the leading contributor to Pakistan's Natural gas production, is the poorest province with 70% of the population living in poverty. This shows how military control over resource extraction funnels resources into military industries and creates regional disparities (Mushtaq, M., & Qureshi, N., 2023).

4.7.4 International Dimensions:

There are also some external complications that arise from Pakistan's hybrid governance model, which despite not being part of our scope are still worth mentioning. When it comes to Nuclear Weapons considerations and urgencies, external powers tend to lean towards dealing with the military leadership, as they are seen as being more reliable than the civilian government (Nasr, 2005). The military's influence over the relationships with India and Afghanistan, its supposed historical relations with militant groups and its position as both a victim and an alleged sponsor of terrorism create challenges for international partners (Haqqani, 2005).

5.0 Prussia and Pakistan Comparative Analysis

5.1.1 Structural Parallels

The Prussian and the Pakistani institutions have significant structural overlap despite the differences in time, culture, and geography.

5.1.2 Institutional Autonomy: All polities developed a military system that was independent of efficient civilian control. Military in Prussia was a "state within a state" and the same is echoed in Pakistan with the deep state whereby Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) holds power in parallel with the official government system.

5.1.3 Reserved Domains: In both cases, the military claims exclusive right to specific policy space such as that of defense, intelligence and specific aspects of foreign policy and thus eliminates any civilian counter before creating a conflict.

5.1.4 Administrative Capacity: The two systems also demonstrate organization competence in areas which are subordinate to the military. The German ability to mobilize the armies, logistics, and strategy have their counterpart in the Pakistani army and their highly sophisticated ability to organize themselves compared to the institutions in the civilian sector.

5.1.5 Democratic Deficits: The two systems do not create effective democratic accountability. In Germany, the Reichstag in Prussia had no authority over the crucial operations of the state and in Pakistan, the parliament is bound by the power of the military veto.

5.1.6 Economic Involvement: Military organizations in both societies have extended their reach beyond traditional functions of the military in defense and, to varying extents, to the economic activity. In Prussia and the Junker officers-controlled landholding and agricultural production, but in Pakistan the military run enterprises of a kind of business (Milbus) directly regulate commercial activity in all its spheres.

5.2 Critical Differences

The major differences between the two cases inform the development of theory.

5.2.1. Direction of Causality: In Prussia, the state institutions united, creating around a military core; in Pakistan a military core responded to a vacuum created by the weak institutions of civilian power.

This confirms that there exist many routes to military hegemony as opposed to one causal paradigm.

5.2.2 Outcome Trajectories: Prussia had become quickly industrialized and unified as a nation, but at a democratic price and with disastrous end results. The case of Pakistan is one of constant instability with no equal growth in development, and this shows that military superiority is not a sure mark of technocratic success.

5.2.3 International Context: Prussia was in a competitive system of great powers which exalted military prowess. The nuclear deterrence, terrorism threats, and the great-powers rivalry between China and the United States pressures are different and Pakistan struggles with these issues, and as such, civil-military relations are unique in Pakistan.

5.2.4 Class Structure: The Prussian military was bound up with Junker aristocratic privilege; the military recruitment is more meritocratic in Pakistan (based on the middle and lower-middle classes). The difference affects institutional culture as well as possibilities of coalitions that the military can forge with the civilian elites.

6. Theoretical Implications

The comparative enquiry provides several insights.

6.1 Military Efficiency Is not the same as State Effectiveness: Both instances reveal that a better organized military unit is not necessarily reflected in a better state overall. Excellence in the Prussian military went hand in hand with political dysfunction that resulted in disastrous war, and yet, good military performance in Pakistan did not stop inappropriate economic underperformance and political misbalance.

6.2 Path Dependence and Institutional Persistence: Both examples demonstrate that early civil military relationships promote the development of self-reinforcing tendencies that are hard to do away with. The constitutional settlement of 1871 in Prussia helped to define German politics until 1945; in Pakistan, the military businesses made in the early years helped to set pattern which still help to organize the political life decades later.

6.3 The Legitimacy Deficit: Military-dominated systems consistently face legitimacy problems. Prussia's democratic deficit contributed to post-WWI instability. Pakistan's hybrid regime generates recurring legitimacy crises as publics reject military political manipulation even when unable to prevent it.

6.4 Economic Costs of Militarization: Both cases support arguments that excessive military influence distorts economic development. Resources flow to military priorities rather than productive investments, rent-seeking opportunities proliferate, uncertainty about property rights and policy continuity discourages investment.

7. Data Analysis: Governance Outcomes

7.1 Quantitative Indicators:

Available secondary data on The World Bank Government Effectiveness score of Pakistan has been consistently negating over the years of measurement (1996-2023), with the lowest scores of -0.83 (2011) and the highest of -0.38 (2006), and the latest score of -0.58 (2023) (Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators 2023, 2023). This is a continuous low level of performance which implies that the governance level is lower than the global average level and Pakistan is ranked as having the bottom-third of the countries in the world.

7.2 Democratic Quality: Freedom House rates Pakistan as "Partly Free" with declining scores in recent years. The 2024 report notes deterioration in electoral integrity, civil liberties, and media freedom (House, 2024). The Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index classifies Pakistan as a "hybrid regime," scoring 4.17 out of 10 in 2023, down from 4.31 in 2022 (Unit, 2024).

7.3 Economic Performance: In spite of nuclear capability and a huge population that can afford large market size, Pakistan has experienced low GDP per capita growth, relative to the rest of the region. From 2000-2023, Pakistan's average annual GDP per capita growth was 2.8%, compared to India's 5.4% and Bangladesh's 4.9% (Indicators., 2024). This poor

performance is associated with political instabilities and economic military dominance.

7.4 Social Indicators: Pakistan's Human Development Index (HDI) ranking of 164 out of 193 countries (UNDP, 2023) reflects underinvestment in health and education relative to defence. Life expectancy (66.5 years), mean years of schooling (5.2 years), and maternal mortality (140 per 100,000 live births) all trail regional comparators (UNDP, 2023).

7.5 Correlational Evidence: Although establishing causation is important, the relationships between poor governance outcomes and military dominance are highly notable.

7.6 Defence Spending and Development: Cross-national studies refer to the presence of negative correlations between the level of military expenditure as a fraction of the GDP and the achievements of human development (Dunne, J. P., & Tian, N., 2015). By comparison, the military expenditure of Pakistan (2.12- 2.7 percent of GDP) indicates the correlation of poor performance in terms of HDI with other countries with similar income and lower military expenditures.

7.7 Political Instability and Economic Growth: Political Instability and Economic Growth: It has been found that economically, Pakistan under performs in correlation with the changes of government as there is no elected prime minister who has not served a full term. Research on political instability and economic growth has shown that change of government decreases the investment and returns growth, which is like the situation in Pakistan (Alesina, A., Özler, S., Roubini, N., & Swagel, P., 1996).

7.8 Military Business and Corruption: Militaries with large commercial businesses in the country will be rated badly on the corruption index (International, 2024). This pattern is reflected in Pakistan, the country with Corruption Perceptions Index of 29/100 (Corruption in Pakistan, 2023), which ranks the country at 133rd out of 180.

8. Discussion: The Garrison State Paradox:

8.1.1 The Illusion of Efficiency:

The current discussion reveals what can be called the garrison state paradox: the military-oriented structure can be characterized by administrative efficiency in certain areas and, simultaneously, produce ineffective results in overall governance performance and acceptability. This paradox is a result of several related factors.

8.1.2 Narrow vs. Broad Efficiency: Military organizations are designed to maximize task-oriented aspects to the objectives of the military like command, control, logistics, and operational planning. These skills are not easily extrapolated into complex state activities such as economic administration, societal policy making or negotiated political trade-offs. As an example, the Prussian General Staff was outstanding and efficient in mobilization of armies but was incapable of averting political dysfunctions that culminated in disastrous wars.

8.1.3 Short-term vs. Long-term Trade-offs: The military can either solve the existing crisis or set an image of order in situations of chaos. However, such intervention also undermines civilian institutions and creates precedents that further military intervention can be continued. The military interventions that Pakistan faced and each of them solved a short-run political crisis but embedded a pattern of institutional stifling in the long-term institutional development.

8.1.4 Capability vs. Legitimacy: The military institutions have tendencies of having better organizational resources than weak civilian institutions, but they are not legitimate to sustain governance. Pakistan is a situation where the armed forces are better placed to respond with disaster relief than the civilian communities; the armed forces are however not in a position to grant legitimacy to the governments they install thus creating a perpetual instability.

8.1.5 Mechanisms of Democratic Erosion:

The Prussian and Pakistani cases demonstrate that military hegemony undermines the process of democracy by the following processes.

8.1.6 Institutional Stunting: When military establishments claim "reserved domains" beyond civilian authority, democratic institutions cannot develop capacity in those areas. The Prussian parliament was never given power of foreign and defense policy, and the Pakistani parliament is equally confined which further strengthens institutional weakness which in turn authorizes further interventions of the military.

8.1.7 Elite Incentive Distortion: In military dominated regimes, political Patronage by ambitious politicians and bureaucrats is determined by military rather than by developing an independent popular base or accumulating substantive policy experience. This transformation transforms political rivalry into a battle of military preference as opposed to a battle of popular consent and so corrupts democratic accountability.

8.1.8 Civic Culture: This is a military predominance that inculcates the civic inclinations that promote a hierarchical setting, obedience and distrust to political dialogue which spans the military culture to the rest of society. Probably the veneration of military values in Prussian culture has led to the tolerance of Nazis authoritarianism whereas in Pakistan, military respect, despite its poor governance results, is still high, and it represents similar cultural processes.

8.1.9 Economic Rent-seeking: Military intervention into economy creates possibilities of corruption and rent-seeking to take away resources used in productive activities. What is of greater essence is that it builds powerful constituencies which are the military officers, allied enterprises, beneficiaries of the military patronage, which have an invested number of interests to counter democratic reforms threatening the privileges of these constituents.

8.1.10 The Vicious Cycle:

A particularly pernicious finding is the self-reinforcing nature of military dominance. Weak civilian institutions justify military intervention; military intervention prevents civilian institutional development; continued civilian weakness justifies further military involvement. This creates a vicious cycle difficult to escape:

1. Early military intervention (as a response to crisis, bad civilian government, or foreign attack). 2. These are the atrophic or capacity-less efforts of civilian institutions.

3. The ineffective governance of civilians creates another crisis.

4. There seems to be a necessity of military intervention because of civilian incapability.

5. The cycle repeats.

The only way to break out of such cycle is to empower civilian capacity alongside limiting military prerogatives a rather delicate balancing act that few states manage to do successfully.

9. Policy Implications and Recommendations:

9.1 Constitutional and Legal Reforms:

9.1.1 Civilian Supremacy: The doctrine of civilian supremacy requires constitutional documents to openly recognize civilian preeminence over military institutions, establish clear chains of control and civilian controls. Despite this formal signing of the Pakistani constitution on the part of civilian control, the reality on the ground suggests otherwise, with a discrepancy making way between what is stipulated in the constitution and real practice, referring to lack of enforcing mechanisms and the resistance of the military veto power.

9.1.2 Defence Oversight: To provide effective oversight on the defense front, the parliamentary committees with substantive investigative authority, qualified experts in service, as well as legitimate access to classified information, is necessary to oversee defense spending and develop defense policy. Approval of defense budgets in Pakistan within Parliament is still not substantial though, the legislature does not have the necessary abilities to carry out effective scrutiny.

9.1.3 Intelligence Reform: The intelligence agencies should be open to civilian supervision under strong legal institutions that limit the participation in political affairs locally. The political status of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) must also be declared illegal and punishments enforced in case such proclamation goes against it.

9.1.4 Judicial Independence: The constitutional protection of judicial independence must be provided with express provisions that ensure that the judiciary is not coerced by the military. Such structural protection is required due to the recent judiciary crisis observed in Pakistan when judges have reported the fear of lawlessness by the ISI.

9.2 Economic Reforms:

9.2.1 Military Business Divestiture: Commercial activities previously owned by the military should be privatized or privatized under the traditional procedures of corporate governance which require complete transparency, taxation, and adherence to stricter regulations. Based on this, civilian audit exercise and competitive tendering processes to contractual engagements should apply to the Milbus bodies in Pakistan.

9.2.2 Transparency of Defence Budget: Full disclosure of defense spending, including welfare bases and business enterprises, requires the approval of parliament and its review by the citizens. Hidden defense budgets promote corruption and prevent proper discussion of resources allocation by the people.

9.2.3 Development Rebalancing: It is necessary to undertake strategic rebalancing between defense and investments in human capital that lead to a sustained growth in the economy. The high ratio of current defense expenditure to education expenditure and health expenditure in Pakistan that stands at more than 2:1 in favor of defense deserves inversion.

9.3 International Support:

9.3.1 Conditionality: The conditionality of international financial aid should be based on evidenced presence of civilian control over military bodies. Routine modalities often contribute to the promotion of military power unintentionally as the main interlocutors are the military leaders.

9.3.2 Capacity Building: International partners must consider building civilian capacities, such as training parliamentary staffs, civilian defence policy expertise, fostering the use of independent media and reinforcing civil societies, as opposed to just

concentrating on interaction with the military counterparts.

9.3.3 Regional Solution: The security dilemmas in Pakistan especially in its relations with India require regional solutions that would effectively consider concerns relating to legitimate security issues and address the motivation of military hegemony. The political sensitization of the military apparatus can be explained by the existence of tensions between India and Pakistan over a long period of time. The global economic collapse has significantly affected younger populations in the country, especially women who hold fewer employment rights compared to men.

9.4 Evaluation of Difficulties:

These recommendations face imposing odds, the first against them pressure by the popular against the military establishments to change the existing pattern of reforms that challenge institutional privileges. Besides, the capacity shortfall in the civilian institutions makes the process of implementing the reforms hard despite the political feasibility of the reformation. The actors on the international scene often focus on the short-term stability or collaboration on certain problems like terrorism and security within the region at the cost of promoting the process of developing democracy.

Above all, to have meaningful reform requires a combination of manifest outside pressure, the internal division of a crisis that undermines existing arrangements, or the presence of the enlightened military command that will give political ground away, which is a rare mixture. The democratic transition in Chile was helped by the coincidence of the three factors, but Pakistan has not succeeded in such a coincidence.

10. Conclusion:

This comparative article on Prussia and Pakistan helps to reveal some of the basic flaws in the assumption that a strong military culture enhances state effectiveness and democratic growth. Even though military institutions can display organizational effectiveness in specific areas, their system of political dominance is not only systematically subverting democratic rule but is also causing distortions in economic growth as well as

generating lack of legitimacy which leads to a cycle of continuous instability.

The historical path of Prussia, starting with efficient autocracy, then bringing disaster with catastrophic militarism and culminating with the abolition, shows that technical efficiency without democratic controls is suicidal. The long history of the Pakistan nation fighting off the military dominance of twenty-seven years shows that the hybrid forms of structures trying to harmonize the military power with the democratic ones are never able to meet the demands of either democratic or the developmental needs.

Several conclusions can be drawn that have an implication beyond these special cases:

Military Professionalism is Insufficient: Huntington is right in his assertion that military professionalism has failed to bring the hoped-of guarantee of political neutrality in both Prussian and Pakistani settings. Instead, professional competence may co-exist with and even make possible more elaborate political involvement in it, thus making possible more elaborate types of manipulation that disrupt the supposedly neutral image of professional competence.

The hybrid forms of equilibrium: where the mechanisms of democracy are bound together with the military veto power, are not the cases of the stable intermediate states, but they create endemic crises. The Prussian constitutional monarchy and the current hybrid regime of Pakistan failed to provide long-term government, which demonstrates how unstable such structures are.

Economic Costs Are Substantial: military intervention in the economy warps development with the misallocation of resources, rent seeking, and the culture of uncertainty. The two cases have never enjoyed long-term or fair economic growth under the leadership of regimes characterized by military institutions.

Path Dependence Matters: The initial decisions about the relationship between civil and military prompting self-institutionalizing trends, which acquire greater resistance to change. Institutional

change becomes increasingly painful as militaristic political involvements become an order of the day.

Legitimacy Cannot Be Manufactured: The institutions of the military have structures of influencing political results through either manipulation or coercion but cannot create genuine legitimacy. This results in chronic turmoil with the citizens opposing military pre-eminence consolidation.

The policy implication is clear: Sustainable development requires independence of military formations by the real civilians, eliminating any pseudo-democratic formulations, which carry military veto forces. This is not a matter of attenuation of military function or professionalism but coordination of the military forces to civilian authorities of democratic control and their reduction to conventionally professional functions.

As in the Pakistani case, actionable progress is associated with hard-decision-making. The military system would be forced to yield to genuine civilian preeminence; the non-military institutions would need to nurture managerial efficiency; and foreign allies would have to be more democratic builders rather than shortsighted expediency. Even though these measures are quite daunting, the other option which goes on with hybrid governance can only beget further chronic instability, low performance, and repeated crises that Pakistan has long been enduring. The garrison state and what it alleges to be efficient is a mirage in the end. Good governance will depend on the institutions based on the responsibility to the people, the leaders who will be elected in the most authentic case of democratic contests and militaries that are professionally ready to accommodate a subordinate constitutional position. This observation is based on the disastrous path taken by Prussia, which was unable to eliminate it, and Pakistan, which is still fighting the constant battle of seeing to it that the sword does not exceed the state and vice versa.

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