Journal of Media Horizons
ISSN: 2710-4060 2710-4052 Volume 6, Issue 7, 2025

FAKE NEWS AND NEWS SEEKING BEHAVIOUR: DOES PARTISANSHIP LEAD TO SELECTIVE EXPOSURE?

Muhammad Shahbaz Siddique[*1], Dr. Savera Mujib Shami[2]

[*1]*Ph.D. Scholar, School of Communication Studies, University of the Punjab, Lahore*
[2]*Professor & Chairperson of Department of Digital Media, School of Communication Studies, University of the Punjab, Lahore*

[*1]rajashahbaz.siddique@gmail.com

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17906262

Keywords
fake news, selective exposure, partisanship, news seeking behaviour, social media, Pakistani political parties

Article History
Received: 05 July 2025
Accepted: 25 November 2025
Published: 12 December 2025

Corresponding Author: * Muhammad Shahbaz Siddique

Abstract
A well-functioning democracy demands a well-informed populace, yet, today, both are threatened by the widespread presence of fake news on social media. Combating the menace of fake news requires finding out the potential antecedents of the spread of fake news. One of such possible factors is the audiences' online news consumption patterns. The individuals who adopt biased news seeking behaviour in their engagement with the political content on social media, under the influence of their partisanship–selective exposure–are highly vulnerable to fake news. In this study, an attempt is made to examine the relationship between partisanship and news seeking behaviour of followers of different Pakistani political parties on social media. In an online survey experiment, 762 followers of six major political parties in Islamabad and Punjab reported their likelihood of seeking attitude-consistent, attitude-inconsistent and attitude-neutral political news on social media on a Likert scale. The findings indicated that individuals exhibited partisan or selective news seeking behaviour showing preference to the content that matched their political viewpoints which was explained by the selective exposure theory. It elucidates that the individuals selectively seek or expose to information that is aligned with their pre-existing beliefs or narratives and in this case the political information on social media. This selective exposure to political news has serious implications for the spread of fake news such as the partisans tend to not only consume fake news but also believe and share them on social media especially that match their political outlook even when they are flagged as disputed by the fact-checkers.

INTRODUCTION

Fake news is the term in vogue but not for the right reasons. On the one hand, the political actors employ this term to discredit journalists and news media, and on the other hand, its usage refers to the online spread of disinformation (Egelhofer & Lecheler, 2019). In both the ways, the phenomenon of fake news is posing a serious threat to democracies around the globe (Egelhofer et al., 2020; Monsees, 2023; Reglitz, 2022). Democracy requires a well-informed electorate for its smooth functioning (Dahl, 1983; Milner, 2002; Schudson, 1998) but in the widely diffused presence of fake news (Vosoughi et al., 2018) it has become very difficult for a common person to identify which news is and is not fake or in other words to differentiate between fictitious and factual information. Similarly, an ideal voter is the one whose decisions are well-informed (Berelson et

al., 1954), but if people rely on fake news, their decisions could only damage democracy.

Nowadays, fake news has become a serious concern more than ever. These are the news articles that are designed to resemble real news and carry verifiably false and fabricated information to mislead people (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; El Mikati et al., 2023; Gelfert, 2018; Kwek et al., 2023; Lazer et al., 2018; Pennycook et al., 2018; Rubin et al., 2015). Although not new, the issue of fake news has gained a surge in the last decade (O'Connor & Weatherall, 2019; t'Serstevens et al., 2022). Especially in 2016, the pre and post US presidential elections raised serious concerns over the truth and facticity in the arena of political communication vis-à-vis fake news (Egelhofer et al., 2020). There were circulated factually incorrect news stories before the polls to influence them (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Bleakley, 2023; Lee, 2019) and after the elections, Donald Trump hurled a comment at a journalist: 'You Are Fake News', in his first press conference as a president. These incidents generated a serious debate among different segments of society including the academicians which found a renewed interest to study fake news (Jones-Jang et al., 2021; Lewandowsky et al., 2017; Mason et al., 2018; Pennycook et al., 2018). It was further stimulated by the events having global impact such as the referendum of Brexit in 2016 (Kucharski, 2016; Rose, 2017) and more recently the case of COVID-19 (Greene & Murphy, 2021).

Fake News and Social Media

In this information age (Buchbinder & Newson, 2021), owing to the advancements in the information and communication technologies (Radovan, 2013), a major shift has been seen in the news consumption by individuals where the new or social media is rapidly replacing the old or traditional media (Freeman, 2013; Yanardağoğlu, 2020; M. P. Rose, 2023) and it has made inroads in the political sphere too (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2017). Today, any person who wants to keep themselves updated with the recent happenings in the political, economic or social world, they most often engage with the social media rather than mainstream media (Duffy, 2020; Molyneux, 2017; Sasseen et al., 2013; Shu et al., 2017; Struckmann & Karnowski, 2016; Westerman et al., 2014; Westlund; 2016).

Social media acts like a double-edged sword: it has empowered citizens in terms of their engagement with content, but it has also contributed to the spread of fake news (Domenico et al., 2021). Although the diffusion of fake news has existed in the past, social media has sped up the process (Rampersad & Althiyabi, 2020; Lazer et al., 2018). Its quick, cost-effective and accessible nature has attracted people to consume news on social media, but it has also facilitated the process of sharing fake news on a greater scale (Shu et al., 2017). On the one hand, it informs users in a faster and democratic way, but on the other hand it has created a strong need to verify the information being circulated online (Jones-Jang et al., 2021) because it is observed to be one of the major sources contributing to the dissemination of fake news (Narwal, 2018).

Interestingly, the diffusion of fake news does not stop at the stage of being disseminated but rather it moves further to cause greater trouble when people who consume such information start believing it (Bryanov & Vziatysheva, 2021; French et al., 2025). Especially, social media platforms have provided an ideal environment for people to believe in fake news. Put it differently, social media has not only given birth to fake news but also brought it up and made it walk on its own (Bryanov & Vziatysheva, 2021; French et al., 2025, Pennycook et al., 2018).

Fake News and News Consumption Behaviours

In this scenario, the question arises, what should be done to fight the menace of fake news? To find an answer to this question, we must first identify the causes behind its spread. Once the factors are highlighted, it will become easier to devise adequate strategies to tackle the problem of false or misleading information (Pennycook & Rand, 2021). One way to identify why fake news diffuse in the society could be to dig into the patterns and practices adopted by people to consume political information on social media. Approaching fake news from the angle of consumers, audience or users, instead of from the angle of spreaders is intended in this study.

To put it another way, does the certain news consumption behaviours of people have any implication for the spread of fake news?

Fake news creation and consumption are seemingly two different roles but have started to readily blur. They are apparently two different ends but the clear line between them is waning (Kim et al., 2021). If we look into the process of dissemination of fake news, we find that there are two key stakeholders. One is who creates it and the other one is who consumes it. The focus of this study is on the second player, i.e., the one who consumes fake news. The researchers present the idea in this study that news consumers (audience), too, passively and indirectly participate in the process of spreading fake news. But how?

News consumption behaviours are the ways individuals consume news, and in this case, on social media. Elihu Katz in his editorial commentary explained that the future of mass communication research would be to investigate the angle of 'what do people do with the media' instead of only what do media do to people (1959). One of these news consumption behaviours is news seeking behaviour which is examined in this study to investigate if this news behaviour has any potential flaws that could lead to the spread of fake news.

News Seeking Behaviour and Partisanship

Human beings are instinctively driven to be aware of the happenings around them and the efforts to discover or find out is known as news seeking behaviour (Danielson & Stempel, 1958). In the past, it was interpersonal or group communication, then mass communication in the form of print and electronic media and nowadays social media is resorted to by people to stay in touch with the latest news. In this context, one of the motivating factors that drive people to use certain news content to keep themselves updated is partisanship, which is also recognized in the studies as amongst the several antecedents of dissemination of fake news (Osmundsen et al., 2021; Pretus et al., 2023; Turel, 2023). In simple words, it refers to the usage of certain information for certain purposes.

Partisanship is a social identification in which people have, feel or express their commitment, attachment or inclination towards a certain political party or group (Campbell et al., 1960; Elliott, 2024; Iyengar & Krupenkin, 2018; Mason, 2018; Putnam, 2000). It is necessarily a result of their formal or informal belonging or attachment with those groups which makes it harder for them to change the biased attitudes they have about things (Severin & Tankard, 1992). Communication behaviours are influenced by groups; the way we receive, perceive, interpret or accept a message can be filtered through the effect people have on us as a group, in this case political parties (Severin & Tankard, 1992). Our association with a political party motivates us to view the world in a politically attitude-consistent manner (Druckman et al., 2013; Gentzkow, 2016; Jerit & Barabas, 2012; Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Taber & Lodge 2006).

Partisanship persuades individuals to process and use political information in a biased way—matching their political beliefs (Jones & Sugden, 2001; Taber & Lodge, 2006). In other words, these news consumptions behaviours become selective. There are also referred to as partisan because people exhibit them due to the influence of their partisanship. In this way, the chances of people using selective information increase which can lead to creating a space where existence of fake news becomes easier.

Selective Exposure Theory

The research on news seeking behaviour has been dominated by the theme of selective exposure with a specific context of the debate of limited or strong media effects (Stroud, 2010). This selective exposure is often referred to as politically motivated or partisan exposure, received both supporting (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944) and challenging (Sears & Freedman, 1967) empirical evidence in research also noted by Garrett (2009b).

Selective exposure is the inclination in individuals to consume information that is aligned with their pre-existing beliefs or narrative (Cinelli et al., 2020). It found its traces back to Lazarsfeld study which indicated that people expose to and perceive media content selectively, i.e., using opinion leaders as a two-step way and to reinforce strongly held political beliefs (Lazarsfeld et. al, 1944). Afterwards, this

was further explained by Festinger that people resort to selective news behaviour to avoid cognitive dissonance (1957). Later, Joseph Klapper elaborated on selective exposure by explaining that it helped people protect and reinforce their already held partisan beliefs along with other selective processes (1960). In recent times, the selective seeking or exposure to opinion-reinforcing political content was found across followers of different political parties (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009; Jones et al., 2011) and across media types—print, electronic and Internet (Bakshy et al., 2015; Stroud, 2008) and in hard and soft media content as well especially this preference was seen prominently in partisans with higher political engagement (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009). Furthermore, not only that partisan selective exposure existed (Humanes & Valera-Ordaz, 2023) but increased over time (Rodriguez et al., 2017).

Another somewhat different stream of research found which treat evidence against the common understanding of politically motivated selective exposure is that among online media users, seeking and avoiding are two distinct behaviours; one might involve in seeking attitude-consistent without avoiding attitude-inconsistent political information (Garrett, 2009b; Garrett & Stroud, 2014; Jang, 2014; Rafiq et al., 2024) while the mediated role of different emotions such as fear, anger and enthusiasm on the partisan selective exposure was also found (DuBosar et al., 2024; Song, 2016).

Problem Statement

The widespread presence of fake news on social media around the globe and especially in Pakistan is a matter of great concern. The study investigates the role of partisanship in shaping the news seeking behaviour of followers of different political parties on social media and its implications for the spread of fake news.

Research Gap

There is an increasing body of international research literature contributing to the understanding of factors leading to the spread of fake news on social media, but in the Pakistani context, this domain is emerging and relatively very little is known. This study will increase the empirical knowledge about partisanship and its influence on the news seeking behaviour of the followers of different political parties in Pakistan on social media and its implications for the diffusion of fake news especially using the theoretical explanation of selective exposure theory.

Research Objective

To study the relationship between partisanship and news seeking behaviour of followers of different Pakistani political parties on social media

Research Methodology

The study used the quantitative methodology by employing the survey experiment or experimental survey method which is defined as conducting an experiment on a survey. It is a mix of both the methods i.e., survey and experiment. Both the methods are unique in their own way having certain strengths and limitations. One of the key features of survey is generalizability and of experiment is causation. Combining survey and experiment yields the generalizability with causation or in other words causal inference along with external validity. It helps us address the limitations rooted in non-experimental survey method and experiments with a small convenient sample (Gaines et al., 2007; Sniderman, 2011). There are multiple studies carried out on the theme of news consumption behaviours including news seeking behaviour of users which adopted the survey experiment method (Adjin-Tettey, 2022; Colliander, 2019; Shephard et al., 2023; Talwar et al., 2019; t'Serstevens et al., 2022; Westerwick et al., 2020).

Target Population, Sampling and Data

The target population of the study was the followers of six major political parties, mentioned below, living in Punjab and the federal capital territory, Islamabad (ICT), who are social media users of all age brackets and gender. The political parties included Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PMLN), Pakistan Peoples Party Parliamentarians (PPPP), Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam-Fazal (JUI-F) and Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan (JIP). The

participants were reached through non-probability sampling techniques—a combination of both convenient sampling and snowball sampling—which were adequate keeping in view the practical constraints and nature of the study. We employed the Google Forms to reach the participants using my personal and professional social networks through physical meeting and using messenger option, status updates, posts of feed and groups on WhatsApp, Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat (friends, family, colleagues, etc.). In this way, the participants were selected based on convenience and their willingness to take part in the study. Additionally, we asked the people for referrals. This method, the snowball sampling, rendered through recommendations and referrals the new participants which were beyond our reach. The data were collected for the survey experiment using an online survey conducted through Google Forms, furnished in English and Urdu both, which generated an excel format sheet. I further coded data into SPSS software for the analyses.

Three Stages of the Study

The current study was conducted in three stages. At the first stage, the pre-pilot study, a pool of news items (headlines) was prepared to measure people's news seeking behaviour. The pool of news items (headlines), that were attitude-consistent, attitude-inconsistent and attitude-neutral towards each of the six political parties. The news items were written in Urdu language for the ease of reading for everyone. Careful attention was given to ensure that news items covered the 5Ws and 1H, news worthiness, recency (almost 80% of items were of 2023-2024) and element of interest. Almost all the news items primarily had the element of fake news: false information, factually incorrect, or verifiably false data means some facts were modified or distorted or attributions were changed. The relevance to the topic and direction of news was ensured too. The tone of news was not too soft and not too harsh, but they clearly demonstrated the direction of the content. The news type was only political, and news source was absent to keep them both constant. Then we availed the services of experts to rate this pool of news to finally select the three attitude-consistent, three attitude-inconsistent and two attitude-neutral news items to be included in the survey experiment. The experts included academicians and professionals related to the field of media, journalism, news, etc. They rated news for the direction and topic relevance of news. The topics covered in the news items were as follows: elections, parliament and government, judiciary, civil military relations, media and freedom of expression, economy, Pak-US relations, dialogue, protest, personal life and family of political leaders. A questionnaire was designed to measure partisanship, social media use of participants and to collect data about their demographics.

At the second stage, we conducted a pilot study to test the real application of our research design and rectify any issues regarding the operationalization and measurement of the variables of the study. A sample of 50 students at a government college in Rawalpindi affiliated with a university, both male and females, was taken. The findings of the pilot study suggested some changes in the target population which was later modified and incorporated in the final study. At the third stage, the actual study was conducted. We provided the participants with a survey experiment containing the measures of the study.

Hypotheses

H1: People are more likely to seek attitude-consistent (pro) political news online than attitude-inconsistent (anti) and attitude-neutral news (neutral).

H2: Strong partisans are more likely to seek attitude-consistent political news online than attitude-inconsistent and attitude-neutral news.

A conceptual framework is presented in Figures 1 and 2.

Conceptual Framework



Figure 1
Comparison of News Seeking Behaviour Across News Types (Pro, Anti, Neutral)



Figure 2
Comparison of News Seeking Behaviour by Partisanship Strength Across News Types

Measures

General Questionnaire

The general survey questionnaire contained measures of demographical information, social media use (measure used by Chu et al., 2016), political affiliation (Michigan Scale, developed by Campbell et al., 1960), and partisanship (Seven-Point Michigan Scale, developed by Campbell et al., 1960).

News Seeking Behaviour

It was measured by providing them with a set of eight political news (headlines) in Urdu language selected by the experts from a larger

pool of news, out of which three news were pro (attitude-consistent), three news were anti (attitude-inconsistent), and two news were neutral (attitude-neutral). The statistical tests were applied on average scores of each type of news for the equal representation in comparison across pro, anti and neutral news. The news items were attitude-consistent and attitude-inconsistent depending on the political leaning of the participant, i.e., party affiliation. The participants reported their likelihood of reading news in detail on a 5-point Likert scale from very unlikely to very likely. The instrument was adopted from the study of Westerwick et al. (2020) and modified. The reliability was established, and the details are given in the next section.

Reliability Analysis

News Seeking Behaviour (P, A, N) Scale

The reliability test was conducted on the news seeking behaviour (P, A, N) scale which produced around or above .70 (common threshold $\alpha \geq .70$), which demonstrated that the scale is strongly internally consistent as shown in Table 1.

Table 1

Summary of Reliability (Cronbach's α) Scores of Measures Used in the Study

Measure / Scale	Reliability - Cronbach's α
News Seeking Behaviour (P)	.83
News Seeking Behaviour (A)	.77
News Seeking Behaviour (N)	.66

Note. P = Pro, A = Anti, N = Neutral.

Findings

A total of 762 participants took part in the study, out of which 62.3% were males and 37.7% were females. As shown in Table 2 and Figure 3 provided, the distribution of participants along with political affiliations is presented. The majority of participants (59.6%) were followers of PTI, followed by PMLN (21.9%). The third most frequently reported political party was TLP (6.8), while the least frequently reported political party was JUI-F (2%). Since Punjab was the stronghold of these two political parties (PTI and PMLN), the representation was somewhat understandable.

Table 2

Participant Distribution Across Political Affiliation

Political Affiliation	Frequency	Percent
PTI	454	59.6%
PMLN	167	21.9%
PPPP	26	3.4%
TLP	52	6.8%
JUI-F	15	2%
JIP	48	6.3%
Total	762	100%



Figure 3
Participant Distribution Across Political Affiliation

Table 3 and Figure 4 exhibited that the distribution of participants across partisanship levels. The majority (39.2%) of participants were strong followers of the political parties, followed by weak followers (32.9%). The smallest group—lean followers—accounts for 27.8% of the sample.

Table 3
Distribution of Participants by Partisanship Levels

Partisanship Levels	Frequency	Percent
Lean Follower	212	27.8%
Weak Follower	251	32.9%
Strong Follower	299	39.2%
Total	762	100%



Figure 4
Distribution of Participants by Partisanship Levels

Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics of the measures used in the study.

Table 4

Descriptive Statistics of Measures

Measure	N	Min	Max	Mean	SD
	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic
Age	762	16	92	27.69	9.55
News Seeking Behaviour (P)	762	1	5	3.08	1.13
News Seeking Behaviour (A)	762	1	5	2.70	1.03
News Seeking Behaviour (N)	762	1	5	2.92	1.10

Note. P = Pro, A = Anti, N = Neutral. All variables represent mean scores except age variable.

Hypothesis Testing

A mixed-design ANOVA analysis was performed to find out whether news type—pro, anti, neutral—influenced news seeking behaviour of participants and whether the influence changed across levels of partisanship—lean followers, weak followers, strong followers. As shown in Table 5 that the sphericity assumption was met in the Mauchly's Sphericity Test, $W = 1.00$, $\chi^2(2) = 0.21$, $p = .899$, therefore, the results were reported from uncorrected ANOVA which illustrated that there was a statistically significant main effect of news type on news seeking behaviour of participants, $F(2, 1518) = 76.81$, $p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .09$, suggesting that the inclination to seek political news online changed meaningfully with variation in the type of news—pro, anti or neutral. Table 6 displays that a significant main effect of levels of partisanship was also found, $F(2, 759) = 12.32$, $p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .03$, suggesting that participants showed different news seeking behaviour depending on their levels of partisanship. More importantly, there was recorded a statistically significant interaction effect between news type and levels of partisanship, as given in Table 37, $F(4, 1518) = 4.36$, $p = .002$, partial $\eta^2 = .01$. This reflects that news seeking behaviour of individuals was influenced in combination by news type and levels of partisanship. In other words, the trend of participants' news seeking behaviour across three news types changed with the change in levels of partisanship.

Table 5

ANOVA (Within-Subjects) Summary including Mauchly's Test for the Effect of News Type on News Seeking Behaviour

Source	Mauchly's Test of Sphericity				Test of Within-Subjects Effects			
	W	χ^2	df	P	Df	F	p	η^2_p
News Type	1.00	0.21	2	.899	2, 1518	76.81	.000	.09
News Type * Partisanship Levels	—	—	—	—	4, 1518	4.36	.002	.01

Note. Sphericity is assumed ($p > .05$); therefore, uncorrected ANOVA results are reported.

Table 6

ANOVA (Between-Subjects) Summary for the Effects of Partisanship Levels on News Seeking Behaviour

Source	Test of Between-Subjects Effects			
	df	F	P	η^2_p
Partisanship Levels	2, 759	12.32	.000	.03

Using Bonferroni adjustment, presented in Table 7 (Figure 5), the post hoc pairwise comparisons indicated that all differences among the three news types were significant. Individuals reported a significantly higher intent to seek pro political news online as compared to anti news, $p < .001$ and neutral news, $p < .001$. Similarly, they were more likely to seek neutral news than anti news, $p < .001$. These results suggest that participants were more likely to seek

political news items that were either politically attitude-consistent or neutral, rather than politically attitude-inconsistent. Therefore, H1 is supported by the findings that people are more likely to seek pro political news online than anti and neutral news.

Table 7
Pairwise Comparisons: News Type, News Seeking Behaviour

(I) News Type	(J) News Type	Mean Difference (I-J)	SE	p	95% CI	
					LL	UL
Pro	Anti	.361*	0.03	.000	0.29	0.43
	Neutral	.137*	0.03	.000	0.07	0.21
Anti	Pro	-.361*	0.03	.000	-0.43	-0.29
	Neutral	-.224*	0.03	.000	-0.29	-0.15
Neutral	Pro	-.137*	0.03	.000	-0.21	-0.07
	Anti	.224*	0.03	.000	0.15	0.29

Note. Based on estimated marginal means. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. *. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.



Figure 5
Comparison of News Seeking Behaviour Across Pro, Anti, and Neutral News Types

Similarly, strong followers were found seeking political news online significantly higher than lean followers, $p < .001$, and weak followers also reported seeking news higher than lean followers, $p = .008$, while there was no significant difference between weak and strong followers in their news seeking behaviour, $p = .174$ (as can be seen in Table 8).

Table 8
Pairwise Comparisons: Partisanship Levels, News Seeking Behaviour

(I) Partisanship Levels	(J) Partisanship Levels	Mean Difference (I-J)	SE	p	95% CI	
					LL	UL
Lean Follower	Weak Follower	-.274*	0.09	.008	-0.49	-0.06
	Strong Follower	-.432*	0.09	.000	-0.64	-0.22
Weak Follower	Lean Follower	.274*	0.09	.008	0.06	0.49
	Strong Follower	-.158	0.08	.174	-0.36	0.04
Strong Follower	Lean Follower	.432*	0.09	.000	0.22	0.64
	Weak Follower	.158	0.08	.174	-0.04	0.36

	Weak Follower	.158	0.08	.174	-0.046	0.36

Note. Based on estimated marginal means. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. *. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.

Most importantly, according to the estimated marginal means, as given in Table 9 (Figure 6), both news type and partisanship level influenced news seeking behaviour of individuals. News seeking behaviour was recorded highest for pro political news items among strong followers, (M = 3.32), followed by neutral news items (M = 3.07) and lowest for anti news items (M = 2.82). Among weak followers, the similar kind of pattern was observed, with greater news seeking behaviour for pro news items (M = 3.08), followed by neutral news items (M = 2.92) and lowest for anti news items (M = 2.74). On the contrary, lean followers showed less variation in their news seeking behaviour across news types. They were more likely to seek pro and neutral news items almost with the same degree (M = 2.72) while, lower news seeking behaviour, to some extent, for anti news items was reported (M = 2.48).

These findings suggest that exposure to attitude-consistent, i.e., pro political news increases with increase in level of partisanship. Overall, strong partisans exhibited higher news seeking behaviour that aligned with their political affiliation than anti and neutral news (MD = 0.50, 0.25) more sharply as compared to weak (MD = 0.34, 0.16) and lean partisans (MD = 0.24, 0). Therefore, H2 receives the empirical support that strong partisans are more likely to seek pro political news online than anti and neutral news.

Table 9
Partisanship Levels * News Type, News Seeking Behaviour

Partisanship Levels	News Type	Mean	SE	95% CI	
				LL	UL
Lean Follower	Pro	2.72	0.08	2.57	2.87
	Anti	2.48	0.07	2.34	2.62
	Neutral	2.72	0.08	2.57	2.86
Weak Follower	Pro	3.08	0.07	2.94	3.22
	Anti	2.74	0.07	2.61	2.87
	Neutral	2.92	0.07	2.79	3.06
Strong Follower	Pro	3.32	0.06	3.20	3.45
	Anti	2.82	0.06	2.70	2.94
	Neutral	3.07	0.06	2.95	3.20



Figure 6
Comparison of News Seeking Behaviour by Partisanship Level Across News Types

Discussion

The findings of this study are aligned with the results of previous research which identified that people were more inclined to seek political news online that match their political affiliation or ideologies (attitude-consistent) than those that are against their political leanings (attitude-inconsistent) or neutral (attitude-neutral). Moreover, the participants exhibited the least interest in seeking the news items that were attitude-inconsistent among the three types of news which reflected the selective exposure to political news (Bakshy et al., 2015; Humanes & Valera-Ordaz, 2023; Jones et al., 2011; Peterson & Iyengar, 2021; Rodriguez et al., 2017; Stroud, 2008). Such a pattern reinforces the view that partisanship drives selective exposure. On the one hand, there was a general inclination towards seeking news content that aligned with their political viewpoints, and on the other hand, a general avoidance of news content that did not.

Furthermore, strong partisans exhibited higher news seeking behaviour for attitude-consistent news than attitude-inconsistent and attitude-neutral news (Barnidge et al., 2017; Iyengar & Hahn, 2009; Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng, 2009; Rodriguez et al., 2017; Stroud, 2008; Taber & Lodge, 2006). In other words, as the level of partisanship increased, exposure to political information that matches people's political beliefs also increased among strong partisans more sharply compared to both weak and lean partisans.

The manifestation of selective exposure is evident in selective news seeking behaviours of followers of different political parties (Frimer et al., 2017) in Pakistan, reflecting both as a function of partisanship strength and party affiliation. These followers showed a clear preference for attitude-consistent news while showed avoidance towards attitude-inconsistent news.

The skewness depicted in the news seeking behaviour of people is the demonstration of selective exposure because it is one of the major drivers of the news consumption behaviours of people (Cinelli et al., 2020). The patterns appeared in the examination of news seeking behaviours, strengthen the theoretical concept of selective exposure which postulates that people show inclination to seek out political news that match their pre-existing beliefs (Garrett, 2009a; Garrett & Stroud, 2014; Knobloch-Westerwick et al., 2019). Partisan individuals are psychologically motivated to see the world with the lens of their political affiliation. They exhibit selective exposure by exposing themselves to political information that echoes their political worldview (Jones & Sugden, 2001; Stroud, 2011; Knobloch-Westerwick, Johnson et al., 2015; Knobloch-Westerwick, & Meng, 2009).

Implications of Selective Exposure for Fake News

The notion that individuals engage in partisan or selective news seeking behaviour towards the political news on social media is substantiated by the empirical evidence rendered in this study. To put it differently, the selective exposure was observed in the news seeking patterns of the followers of different Pakistani political parties. This selective exposure to political content on social media has serious implications for the spread of fake news.

First, the political partisans tend to consume fake news on social media more often than not (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Guess et al., 2018). Second, the partisan individuals not only consume fake news but are also inclined to believe them (Beauvais, 2022; Moravec et al., 2019), especially which match their political outlook, i.e., supporting their viewpoint and discrediting their opponents (Ardi, 2019), because, on social media, it is easier for people to trust the fake news even when they are flagged as disputed by the fact-checkers (Guess et al., 2018; Pennycook et al., 2018).

Third, interestingly, partisans share such content with others without even knowing or establishing the veracity of the facts presented in the political information (Pennycook et al., 2018). The selective news seeking often leads to selective news sharing which enhances the dangers of sharing fake news. It was documented that the partisan selective sharing complemented selective exposure among followers of different political parties to support their own groups and criticize the rival ones on social media (Shin & Thorson, 2017). More

interestingly, people who process political information in a partisan way deny that their party affiliation has anything to do with it but, at the same time, claim that this is the case with their opponents (Cohen, 2003). This state of denial, unawareness or ignorance, makes them to be susceptible to sharing fake news (Gwebu et al., 2021).

Fourth, the selective exposure leads to create echo chambers in which people interact only with the like-minded ones and filter the content coming from individuals having different or opposite political ideologies (Cinelli et al., 2020; Sunstein, 2001, 2018) which undermines one's ability to see the other side of the picture necessary to formulate well-informed opinions. Surprisingly, upon incidental encounter with attitude inconsistent political content on social media, they actively started seeking attitude-consistent political content (Weeks et al., 2017).

Conclusion

Social media has revolutionized the media landscape by empowering citizens in democratic content generation and accessibility of information but it has also made the dissemination of fake news easier than before. The widespread prevalence of fake news on social media is believed to be causing pollution in the information environment and posing a constant threat to democracy (Grabe & Bucy, 2023; McKay & Tenove, 2020; Meel & Vishwakarma, 2020; Miller & Vaccari, 2020). Since one of the main motivations behind the creation of fake news is the expansion of political or ideological agenda (Allcott & Gentzkow 2017; Tandoc et al., 2018; Shu et al., 2017), the selective exposure to the political news, reflected in the news seeking behaviour, enhances the chances of being succumbed to the fake news. Consequently, the citizens who are exposed to such news end up being misinformed, disinformed, or ill-informed. Hence, they make their political choices based on inaccurate and factually unreliable information leading to the dysfunctioning of democracy (Kuklinski et al., 2000). Coping up with the menace of fake news requires a well-thought-out intervention at the level of social media users who happen to be the partisan individuals. Political affiliation and participation are the core principles of a functioning democracy but, under the influence of partisanship, seeking selective news and relying on political information which could be fake can harm society and democracy (Lewandowsky et al., 2017).

REFERENCES

Allcott, H., & Gentzkow, M. (2017). Social media and fake news in the 2016 election. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 31(2), 211–236. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.31.2.211

Ardi, R. (2019). Partisan selective exposure to fake news content. Makara Human Behavior Studies in Asia, 23(1), 6-16.

Bakshy, E., Messing, S., & Adamic, L. A. (2015). Exposure to ideologically diverse news and opinion on Facebook. Science, 348(6239), 1130–1132. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaa1160

Barnidge, M., Gunther, A. C., Kim, J., Hong, Y., Perryman, M., Tay, S. K., & Knisely, S. (2017). Politically motivated selective exposure and perceived media bias. Communication Research, 47(1), 82–103. https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650217713066

Beauvais, C. (2022). Fake news: Why do we believe it?. Joint Bone Spine, 89(4), 105371.

Berelson, B., Lazarsfeld, P. F., & McPhee, W. N. (1954). Voting: A study of opinion formation in a presidential campaign. University of Chicago Press.

Bleakley, P. (2023). Panic, pizza and mainstreaming the alt-right: A social media analysis of Pizzagate and the rise of the QAnon conspiracy. Current Sociology, 71(3), 509-525.

Bryanov, K., & Vziatysheva, V. (2021). Determinants of individuals' belief in fake news: A scoping review determinants of belief in fake news. PLoS One, 16(6), e0253717.

Buchbinder, H., & Newson, J. (2021). Social knowledge and market knowledge: universities in the information age. In Higher education in the information age (pp. 21–31). Routledge.

Campbell, A., Converse, P. E., Miller, W. E., & Stokes, D. E. (1960). The American voter.

Chu, S.-C., Windels, K., & Kamal, S. (2016). The influence of self-construal and materialism on social media intensity: A study of China and the United States. International Journal of Advertising, 35(3), 569–588.

Cinelli, M., Brugnoli, E., Schmidt, A. L., Zollo, F., Quattrociocchi, W., & Scala, A. (2020). Selective exposure shapes the Facebook news diet. PlOS One, 15(3), e0229129.

Cohen, G. L. (2003). Party over policy: The dominating impact of group influence on political beliefs. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85(5), 808.

Colliander, J. (2019). "This is fake news": Investigating the role of conformity to other users' views when commenting on and spreading disinformation in social media. Computers in Human Behavior, 97, 202–215. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2019.03.032

Dahl, R. A. (1989). Democracy and its critics. Yale University Press.

Dame Adjin-Tettey, T. (2022). Combating fake news, disinformation, and misinformation: Experimental evidence for media literacy education. Cogent Arts & Humanities, 9(1), 2037229. https://doi.org/10.1080/23311983.2022.2037229

Danielson, W. A., & Stempel III, G. H. (1958, August). News-seeking behavior on two college campuses. In Unpublished paper read at convention, Association for Education in Journalism, Columbia, Missouri.

Domenico, G. D., Sit, J., Ishizaka, A., & Nunan, D. (2021). Fake news, social media and marketing: A systematic review. Journal of Business Research, 124, 329–341. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2020.11.037

Druckman, J. N., Peterson, E., & Slothuus, R. (2013). How elite partisan polarization affects public opinion formation. The American Political Science Review, 107(1), 57–79. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23357757

DuBosar, E., Shaughnessy, B., & Hutchens, M. J. (2024). Seeing red (and blue): Partisan identity, emotions, and selective exposure. Media Psychology, 28(2), 210–233. https://doi.org/10.1080/15213269.2024.2347237

Duffy, A. (2020). Smartphones and the news. Routledge.

Egelhofer, J. L., & Lecheler, S. (2019). Fake news as a two-dimensional phenomenon: a framework and research agenda. Annals of the International Communication Association, 43(2), 97–116. https://doi.org/10.1080/23808985.2019.1602782

Egelhofer, J. L., Aaldering, L., Eberl, J. M., Galyga, S., & Lecheler, S. (2020). From novelty to normalization? How journalists use the term "fake news" in their reporting. Journalism Studies, 21(10), 1323-1343.

El Mikati, I. K., Hoteit, R., Harb, T., El Zein, O., Piggott, T., Melki, J., Mustafa, R. A., & Akl, E. A. (2023). Defining misinformation and related terms in health-related literature: Scoping review. Journal of Medical Internet Research, 25. https://doi.org/10.2196/45731

Elliott, K. J. (2024). What is it like to be a partisan? Measures of partisanship and its value for democracy. Perspectives on Politics, 22(3), 584–598. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592723000289X

Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Row, Peterson.

Freeman, K. S. (2013). News consumption behavior of young adults in Malaysia. International Journal of Social Science and Humanity, 3(2), 121.

French, A. M., Storey, V. C., & Wallace, L. (2025). The impact of cognitive biases on the believability of fake news. European Journal of Information Systems, 34(1), 72–93. https://doi.org/10.1080/0960085X.2023.2272608

Frimer, J. A., Skitka, L. J., & Motyl, M. (2017). Liberals and conservatives are similarly motivated to avoid exposure to one another's opinions. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 72, 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2017.04.003

Gaines, B. J., Kuklinski, J. H., & Quirk, P. J. (2007). The logic of the survey experiment reexamined. Political Analysis, 15(1), 1–20.

Garrett, R. K. (2009a). Echo chambers online? Politically motivated selective exposure among Internet news users. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 14(2), 265–285. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1083-6101.2009.01440.x

Garrett, R. K. (2009b). Politically motivated reinforcement seeking: Reframing the selective exposure debate. Journal of Communication, 59(4), 676–699. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2009.01452.x

Garrett, R. K., & Stroud, N. J. (2014). Partisan paths to exposure diversity: differences in pro- and counterattitudinal news consumption. Journal of Communication, 64(4), 680–701. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcom.12105

Gelfert, A. (2018). Fake news: A definition. Informal Logic, 38(1), 84-117.

Gentzkow, M. (2016). Polarization in 2016. Toulouse Network for Information Technology Whitepaper, 1.

Gil de Zúñiga, H., Weeks, B., & Ardèvol-Abreu, A. (2017). Effects of the news-finds-me perception in communication: Social media use implications for news seeking and learning about politics. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 22(3), 105–123. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcc4.12185

Grabe, M. E., & Bucy, E. P. (2023). Towards diagnostics and mitigation of polluted information ecosystems. Historical and philosophical considerations. Problemi Dell'informazione, 48(1), 35–158.

Greene, C. M., & Murphy, G. (2021). Quantifying the effects of fake news on behavior: Evidence from a study of COVID-19 misinformation. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 27(4), 773–784. https://doi.org/10.1037/xap0000371

Guess, A., Nagler, J., & Tucker, J. (2019). Less than you think: Prevalence and predictors of fake news dissemination on Facebook. Science advances, 5(1), eaau4586. https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.aau4586

Guess, A., Nyhan, B., & Reifler, J. (2018). Selective exposure to misinformation: Evidence from the consumption of fake news during the 2016 US presidential campaign. European Research Council, 9(3), 4.

Gwebu, K. L., Wang, J., & Zifla, E. (2022). Can warnings curb the spread of fake news? The interplay between warning, trust and confirmation bias. Behaviour & Information Technology, 41(16), 3552–3573. https://doi.org/10.1080/0144929X.2021.2002932

Humanes, M., & Valera-Ordaz, L. (2023). Partisanship, ideology, and selective exposure: A longitudinal analysis of media consumption in Spain (2008–2019). Media and Communication, 11(2), 113–126. https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v11i2.6280

Iyengar, S., & Hahn, K. S. (2009). Red media, blue media: Evidence of ideological selectivity in media use. Journal of Communication, 59(1), 19–39. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2008.01402.x

Iyengar, S., & Krupenkin, M. (2018). The strengthening of partisan affect. Political Psychology, 39(Suppl 1), 201–218. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12487

Jang, S. M. (2014). Challenges to selective exposure: Selective seeking and avoidance in a multitasking media environment. Mass Communication and Society, 17(5), 665–688. https://doi.org/10.1080/15205436.2013.835425

Jerit, J., & Barabas, J. (2012). Partisan perceptual bias and the information environment. The Journal of Politics, 74(3), 672–684. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022381612000187

Jones, D. A., Ferraiolo, K., & Byrne, J. (2011). Selective media exposure and partisan differences about Sarah Palin's candidacy. Politics & Policy, 39(2), 195–221. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2011.00288.x

Jones, M., & Sugden, R. (2001). Positive confirmation bias in the acquisition of information. Theory and Decision, 50(1), 59–99. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005296023424

Jones-Jang, S. M., Mortensen, T., & Liu, J. (2021). Does media literacy help identification of fake news? Information literacy helps, but other literacies don't. American Behavioral Scientist, 65(2), 371–388.

Katz, E. (1959). Mass communications research and the study of popular culture: An editorial note on a possible future for this journal. Studies in Public Communication, 2(165), 1–6.

Kim, B., Xiong, A., Lee, D., & Han, K. (2021). A systematic review on fake news research through the lens of news creation and consumption: Research efforts, challenges, and future directions. PLOS One, 16(12), e0260080.

Klapper, J. T. (1960). The effects of mass communication. Free Press.

Knobloch-Westerwick, S., & Meng, J. (2009). Looking the other way: Selective exposure to attitude-consistent and counterattitudinal political information. Communication Research, 36(3), 426–448. https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650209333030

Knobloch-Westerwick, S., Johnson, B. K., & Westerwick, A. (2015). Confirmation bias in online searches: Impacts of selective exposure before an election on political attitude strength and shifts. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 20(2), 171–187. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcc4.12105

Knobloch-Westerwick, S., Liu, L., Hino, A., Westerwick, A., & Johnson, B. K. (2019). Context impacts on confirmation bias: Evidence from the 2017 Japanese snap election compared with American and German findings. Human Communication Research, 45(4), 427–449. https://doi.org/10.1093/hcr/hqz005

Kucharski, A. (2016). Study epidemiology of fake news. Nature, 540(7634), 525-525.

Kuklinski, J. H., Quirk, P. J., Jerit, J., Schwieder, D., & Rich, R. F. (2000). Misinformation and the currency of democratic citizenship. The Journal of Politics, 62(3), 790–816.

Kwek, A., Peh, L., Tan, J., & Lee, J. X. (2023). Distractions, analytical thinking and falling for fake news: A survey of psychological factors. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, 10(1), 1-12.

Lazarsfeld, P. F., Berelson, B., & Gaudet, H. (1944). The people's choice: How the voter makes up his mind in a presidential campaign. William Morrow.

Lazer, D. M. J., Baum, M. A., Benkler, Y., Berinsky, A. J., Greenhill, K. M., Menczer, F., Metzger, M. J., Nyhan, B., Pennycook, G., Rothschild, D., Schudson, M., Sloman, S. A., Sunstein, C. R., Thorson, E. A., Watts, D. J., & Zittrain, J. L. (2018). The science of fake news. Science, 359(6380), 1094–1096. https://doi.org/doi:10.1126/science.aao2998

Lee, T. (2019). The global rise of "fake news" and the threat to democratic elections in the USA. Public Administration and Policy, 22(1), 15-24.

Lewandowsky, S., Ecker, U. K. H., & Cook, J. (2017). Beyond misinformation: Understanding and coping with the "post-truth" era. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 6(4), 353–369.

Lewandowsky, S., Ecker, U. K. H., Seifert, C. M., Schwarz, N., & Cook, J. (2012). Misinformation and its correction: Continued influence and successful debiasing. Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 13(3), 106–131.

Mason, L. E., Krutka, D., & Stoddard, J. (2018). Media literacy, democracy, and the challenge of fake news. Journal of Media Literacy Education, 10(2), 1–10.

McKay, S., & Tenove, C. (2020). Disinformation as a threat to deliberative democracy. Political Research Quarterly, 74(3), 703–717. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912920938143

Meel, P., & Vishwakarma, D. K. (2020). Fake news, rumor, information pollution in social media and web: A contemporary survey of state-of-the-arts, challenges and opportunities. Expert Systems with Applications, 153, 112986.

Miller, M. L, & Vaccari, C. (2020). Digital threats to democracy: Comparative lessons and possible remedies. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 25(3), 333–356. https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161220922323

Milner, H. (2002). Civic literacy: How informed citizens make democracy work. UPNE.

Molyneux, L. (2017). Mobile news consumption: A habit of snacking. Digital Journalism, 6(5), 634–650. https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2017.1334567

Monsees, L. (2023). Information disorder, fake news and the future of democracy. Globalizations, 20(1), 153-168.

Moravec, P. L., Minas, R. K., & Dennis, A. R. (2019). Fake News on social media. MIS Quarterly, 43(4), 1343-A13.

Narwal, B. (2018). Fake news in digital media. International Conference on Advances in Computing, Communication Control and Networking (ICACCCN), 977–981. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICACCCN.2018.8748586

O'Connor, C., & Weatherall, J. O. (2019). The misinformation age: How false beliefs spread. Yale University Press.

Osmundsen, M., Bor, A., Vahlstrup, P. B., Bechmann, A., & Petersen, M. B. (2021). Partisan polarization is the primary psychological motivation behind political fake news sharing on Twitter. American Political Science Review, 115(3), 999–1015. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055421000290

Pennycook, G., & Rand, D. G. (2021). The psychology of fake news. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 25(5), 388–402. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2021.02.007

Pennycook, G., Cannon, T. D., & Rand, D. G. (2018). Prior exposure increases perceived accuracy of fake news. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 147(12), 1865.

Peterson, E., & Iyengar, S. (2021). Partisan gaps in political information and information-seeking behavior: Motivated reasoning or cheerleading? American Journal of Political Science, 65(1), 133–147. http://www.jstor.org/stable/45415617

Pretus, C., Servin-Barthet, C., Harris, E. A., Brady, W. J., Vilarroya, O., & Van Bavel, J. J. (2023). The role of political devotion in sharing partisan misinformation and resistance to fact-checking. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 152(11), 3116–3134. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001436

Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. Simon and Schuster.

Radovan, M. (2013). ICT and human progress. The Information Society, 29(5), 297–306.

Rafiq, S., Iqbal, S., & Afzal, A. (2024). The Impact of Digital Tools and Online Learning Platforms on Higher Education Learning Outcomes. Al-Mahdi Research Journal (MRJ), 5(4), 359-369. https://ojs.mrj.com.pk/index.php/MRJ/article/view/342

Rampersad, G., & Althiyabi, T. (2020). Fake news: Acceptance by demographics and culture on social media. Journal of Information Technology & Politics, 17(1), 1–11. https://doi.org/10.1080/19331681.2019.1686676

Reglitz, M. (2022). Fake news and democracy. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 22, 162.

Rodriguez, C. G., Moskowitz, J. P., Salem, R. M., & Ditto, P. H. (2017). Partisan selective exposure: The role of party, ideology and ideological extremity over time. Translational Issues in Psychological Science, 3(3), 254–271. https://doi.org/10.1037/tps0000121

Rose, J. (2017). Brexit, Trump, and post-truth politics. Public Integrity, 19(6), 555–558. https://doi.org/10.1080/10999922.2017.1285540

Rose, M. P. (2023). Digital news consumption behaviour among youngsters in Chennai city. International Journal of Commerce and Management, 3(2), 119–124.

Rubin, V. L., Chen, Y., & Conroy, N. K. (2015). Deception detection for news: Three types of fakes. Proceedings of the Association for Information Science and Technology, 52(1), 1-4.

Sasseen, J., Olmstead, K., & Mitchell, A. (2013). Digital: As mobile grows rapidly, the pressures on news intensify. The Pew Center Project for Excellence in Journalism. The State of the News Media. https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2013/03/19/digital-as-mobile-grows-rapidly-the-pressures-on-news-intensify/

Schudson, M. (1998). The good citizen: A history of American civic life. Simon & Schuster.

Sears, D. O., & Freedman, J. L. (1967). Selective exposure to information: A critical review. Public Opinion Quarterly, 31(2), 194–213. https://doi.org/10.1086/267513

Severin, W. J., & Tankard, J. W. (1992). Communication theories: Origins, methods, and uses in the mass media. Longman New York.

Shephard, M. P., Robertson, D. J., Huhe, N., & Anderson, A. (2023). Everyday non-partisan fake news: Sharing behavior, platform specificity, and detection. Frontiers in Psychology, 14. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1118407

Shin, J., & Thorson, K. (2017). Partisan selective sharing: The biased diffusion of fact-checking messages on social media. Journal of Communication, 67(2), 233–255. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcom.12284

Shu, K., Sliva, A., Wang, S., Tang, J., & Liu, H. (2017). Fake news detection on social media: A data mining perspective. SIGKDD Explorations. Newsletter., 19(1), 22–36. https://doi.org/10.1145/3137597.3137600

Sniderman, P. M. (2011). The logic and design of the survey experiment: An autobiography of a methodological innovation. In J. N. Druckman, D. P. Greene, J. H. Kuklinski, & A. Lupia (Eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science (pp. 102–114). Cambridge University Press.

Song, H. (2016). Why do people (sometimes) become selective about news? The role of emotions and partisan differences in selective approach and avoidance. Mass Communication and Society, 20(1), 47–67. https://doi.org/10.1080/15205436.2016.1187755

Stroud, N. J. (2008). Media use and political predispositions: Revisiting the concept of selective exposure. Political Behavior, 30(3), 341–366. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-007-9050-9

Stroud, N. J. (2010). Polarization and partisan selective exposure. Journal of Communication, 60(3), 556–576. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2010.01497.x

Struckmann, S., & Karnowski, V. (2016). News consumption in a changing media ecology: An MESM-study on mobile news. Telematics and Informatics, 33(2), 309–319. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tele.2015.08.012

Sunstein, C. R. (2018). #Republic: Divided democracy in the age of social media. Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv8xnhtd

t'Serstevens, F., Piccillo, G., & Grigoriev, A. (2022). Fake news zealots: Effect of perception of news on online sharing behavior. Frontiers in Psychology 13. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.859534

Taber, C. S., & Lodge, M. (2006). Motivated skepticism in the evaluation of political beliefs. American Journal of Political Science, 50(3), 755–769. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3694247

Talwar, S., Dhir, A., Kaur, P., Zafar, N., & Alrasheedy, M. (2019). Why do people share fake news? Associations between the dark side of social media use and fake news sharing behavior. Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, 51, 72–82.

Tandoc Jr, E. C., Lim, Z. W., & Ling, R. (2018). Defining fake news? Digital Journalism, 6(2), 137–153. https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2017.1360143

Turel, O. (2023). Polarized sharing of fake news on social media: the complex roles of partisan identification and gender. Behaviour & Information Technology, 43(11), 2424–2441. https://doi.org/10.1080/0144929X.2023.2248282

Vosoughi, S., Roy, D., & Aral, S. (2018). The spread of true and false news online. Science, 359(6380), 1146–1151. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aap9559

Weeks, B. E., Lane, D. S., Kim, D. H., Lee, S. S., & Kwak, N. (2017). Incidental exposure, selective exposure, and political information sharing: Integrating online exposure patterns and expression on social media. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 22(6), 363–379. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcc4.12199

Westerman, D., Spence, P. R., & Van Der Heide, B. (2014). Social media as information source: Recency of updates and credibility of information. Journal of Computer-mediated Communication, 19(2), 171-183.

Westerwick, A., Sude, D., Robinson, M., & Knobloch-Westerwick, S. (2020). Peers Versus Pros: Confirmation Bias in Selective Exposure to User-Generated Versus Professional Media Messages and Its Consequences. Mass Communication and Society, 23(4), 510–536. https://doi.org/10.1080/15205436.2020.1721542

Westlund, O. (2016). Mobile news: The future of digital journalism. In S. A. Eldridge II, B. Franklin (Eds.), The Routledge companion to digital journalism studies (pp. 206–216). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315713793

Yanardağoğlu, E. (2020). 'Just the way my generation reads the news': News consumption habits of youth in Turkey and the UK. Global Media and Communication, 17(2), 149–166. https://doi.org/10.1177/1742766520979729